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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of the three main channels of international trade on 
domestic innovation, namely outward direct investment, inward direct investment (IDI) 
and exports. The number of Triadic patents serves as a proxy for innovation. The data 
set contains 37 countries that are considered to be highly competitive in the world 
market, covering the period 1994 to 2005. The empirical results show that increased 
exports and outward direct investment are able to stimulate an increase in patent output. 
In contrast, IDI exhibits a negative relationship with domestic patents. The paper shows 
that the impact of IDI on domestic innovation is characterized by two forces, and the 
positive effect of cross-border mergers and acquisitions by foreigners is less than the 
negative effect of the remaining IDI.  
 
 
Keywords: International direct investment, Export, Triadic Patent, Outward Direct 
Investment, Inward Direct Investment, R&D, negative binomial model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Globalization” means different things in different contexts. From an economic 
perspective, it refers to the cross-border movements of goods, funds, personnel and 
information. The more easily do such movements take place, the higher is the degree of 
globalization. In this context, the movement of goods refers to trade, while movements 
of funds refer to international direct investment (Liu et al., 2005). Furthermore, based 
on the direction of the flow of capital, foreign direct investment can be broken down 
into outward direct investment (hereafter ODI) and inward direct investment (hereafter 
IDI).  
According to the World Investment Report by the United Nations and the World 
Development Indicators by the World Bank, in 2008 the amounts of ODI and exports 
for the world as a whole over the years have generally exhibited an upward trend. They 
have both accounted for an important share of GDP, as shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3, have 
played an essential role in the process of globalization, and have been regarded as the 
main channels for technology spillover (Branstetter, 2006; Liu & Zou, 2008). 
Furthermore, according to endogenous growth theory, technological innovation is 
important to the “sustained” growth of an economy (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). The 
main reasons for the economic growth of the late-industrializing economies have been 
the acquisition of knowledge and intelligence, technological innovation and human 
capital accumulation (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Hu & Mathews, 2005; Mueller, 
2006). 
From the above, it can be seen that countries that frequently engage in ODI also 
attract IDI and promote export activities. Such behavior raises the issue as to why 
countries wish to engage in such activities. For this reason, we propose the following 
questions: are ODI, IDI and exports capable of enhancing a country’s innovation and 
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technological depth? Conversely, it needs to be asked whether these activities can lower 
a country’s willingness to engage in innovation activities, and over the long term cause 
that country to lack competitiveness in international markets, with the result that the 
economy’s growth can not be sustained, so that the country falls into recession. 
This paper examines, within the context of globalization, the impact of the three 
main channels of international trade, namely ODI, IDI and exports, on domestic 
innovation, where the number of patents serves as a proxy for innovation. By examining 
the impact between countries, within the context of globalization, of ODI, IDI and 
exports on patents, it is hoped that the results of this paper can serve as a reference for 
public and private policy, and that appropriate international trade policies may be 
formulated to increase a country’s innovation activities, upgrade its industrial 
technology, and ultimately promote economic sustainability and stable growth. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of 
the literature on exports and innovation, and international direct investment and 
innovation. Section III presents the variables, data and sample statistics for the 
empirical analysis. Section IV discusses the research methods. Section V introduces the 
empirical model and analyzes the results. Section VI provides the conclusion and some 
suggestions for further research. 
 
2.  Exports, International Direct Investment, and Innovation 
 
Traditional economic theory on the relationship between innovation and exports 
largely focuses on the topic of whether innovation influences exports. For example, the 
technological gap theory (Posner, 1961) and the life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966) both 
argue that innovation will give manufacturers a greater comparative advantage, so that 
they will become net exporters. Moreover, in early studies, the focus was on whether a 
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country that is engaged in innovation activities can provide a boost to exports (Roper & 
Love, 2002; Gourlay & Seaton, 2004; Yang et al., 2004; Gourlay et al., 2005; Roper et 
al., 2006; Tomiura, 2007). In contrast, the impact of exports on innovation has not yet 
led to consistent results (Keller, 2009). In recent years, studies on these two issues have 
focused mainly on discussing the impact of exports on innovation. For example, Lin & 
Yeh (2005) found that the exports of Taiwan’s electronics industry exhibited a 
significantly positive relationship with that industry’s R&D, but that such a relationship 
only existed in the case of manufacturers engaged in foreign direct investment. For 
South Korean manufacturers as an example, Han & Lee (2007) used the number of 
patents approved by the U.S. Patent Office and the South Korean Intellectual Property 
Office (KIPO) as the explained variables to examine the impact of the export ratio on 
innovation. Their results indicated that the proportion of exports only exhibited a 
significant and positive relationship in regard to those patents approved by the U.S. It 
was argued that this difference arose because the different strategies adopted by 
manufacturers in applying for patents either at home or abroad.  
The discussion to date has not taken into consideration the possibility that the 
impact of exports on innovation was subject to a time lag. In fact, the impact of exports 
on innovation is likely to have a deferred effect. For example, Salomon & Shaver (2005) 
discovered that for Spanish manufacturers there existed a significant and positive 
relationship between the export behavior of Spanish manufacturers, with a time lag of 
one or two periods, and the number of products innovated in the domestic economy, as 
well as the number of patent applications. Through exports, it was possible to acquire 
knowledge that was lacking in the domestic market, and thereby to promote innovation. 
In other words, the effect of learning by exporting was found to exist. In order to verify 
this learning effect, Girma et al. (2008) analyzed manufacturers in the U.K. and Ireland. 
Their results showed that Irish exports were able to increase innovation activities with a 
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time lag of one period, whereas in the U.K. there was no compelling evidence to show 
that exports could increase innovation activities. The authors concluded that this 
difference was due to the domestic markets, the sizes of these two countries, and the 
destinations of their exports not being the same. 
Based on Salvatore’s (2007) definition, international direct investment refers to real 
investment engaged in overseas, and includes the acquisition and control of factories, 
capital goods, land, inventory and management. It frequently involves either the setting 
up of overseas subsidiaries or purchasing large quantities of shares in order to obtain the 
right to operate. According to the direction in which the funds for investment flow, a 
distinction may be made between ODI and IDI. Two main types of result may be 
inferred from past empirical studies: in terms of its impact on innovation, international 
direct investment has (1) positive spillover effects, and (2) negative or uncertain 
spillover effects. 
The positive spillover effects refer to the discovery of knowledge spillovers, such as 
technology or management, when engaging in IDI or ODI. This leads to an increase in 
innovation activities in the host country and/or the home country. For example, Lin & 
Yeh (2005) interpret IDI and R&D as being mutually dependent, so that if the quantity 
of input of one increases, the amount of expenditure on the other is also increased. Blind 
& Jungmittag (2004) argued that externally-induced competition has a training effect on 
the host country’s domestic market which, in turn, has a positive effect on the host 
country’s innovation activities. However, Lin et al. (2009) adopted a quite different 
approach to analyzing ODI. They argued that ODI benefits the home country’s 
innovation. Branstetter (2006) also advanced a similar view, and proceeded to consider 
that international direct investment embodied a feedback effect, so that ODI not only 
caused the innovative behavior of the host country to increase, but also led to a positive 
effect on innovation activities in the home country. 
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The negative spillover effect refers to inflows of foreign capital which result in the 
host country becoming excessively dependent on technology, thereby leading to a 
reduction in innovation activities (Kumar, 1987). However, the uncertain spillover 
effect refers to foreign capital impacting the host country’s innovation activities both 
positively and negatively. First, different measurement indicators of IDI are used 
simultaneously, as in Girma et al. (2009), who used the proportion of foreign investment 
and the amount of foreign investment sold domestically as the IDI indicator. The 
empirical evidence showed that the proportion of foreign investment has a positive and 
significant effect on product innovation, while the amount of foreign investment is 
characterized by a significant and negative relationship with product innovation.  
Second, different studies have focused on different industries. For instance, 
Deolalikar & Evenson (1989) sought to estimate the patent demand function for India. 
Their empirical results indicated that the higher the proportion of foreign investment in 
the chemical industry, the smaller the number of patents. In contrast, in the light 
engineering and other engineering industries, IDI was found to be positively related to 
patents.  
Finally, various results have also been obtained when international direct 
investment is decomposed into ODI and IDI. For instance, Pottelsberghe & Lichtenberg 
(2001) used a sample of 13 OECD countries to examine whether FDI led to a 
technology transfer effect, and concluded that transfers of technology across borders as 
part of FDI should not be considered in one direction only. Thus, they decomposed FDI 
into ODI and IDI in order to view capital flows as moving in two directions. Their 
empirical evidence showed that ODI is a technology spillover channel that has both a 
significant and positive effect on the domestic country’s total factor productivity. In 
contrast, IDI did not help to improve the technology of the host country, and even 
adversely affected it. The reason for this was that IDI had a tendency to acquire 
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technology from the host country, and then to give this technology, which it did not 
disseminate in its own country (the home country), to another country (the host 
country). 
In addition, as the proportion of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (hereafter 
cross-border M&As,) in international direct investment has been increasing annually 
(UNCTAD, 2007), in empirical research the topic of IDI has also been examined 
together with that of cross-border M&As. For example, Liu & Zou (2008) found that the 
significant and positive relationship between cross-border M&As activities in China’s 
high-technology industry and innovation only existed among different industries, and 
that within a particular industry the relationship was positive but not significant. The 
reason for this was that mergers and acquisitions activities may increase the degree of 
industrial concentration and monopoly power, so that industries within the same 
domestic sector will be characterized by relatively little innovative behavior.  
Using a sample of 14 OECD member states, Bertrand & Zuniga (2006) examined 
the relationship between cross-border M&As by foreigners and R&D, and their 
empirical results showed that the overall relationship was positive but not significant. 
By focusing on the industries’ technology intensity, the relationships between these 
mergers and acquisitions activities and R&D for high, medium and low levels of 
technology were found to be negative and not significant, significant and positive, and 
positive and not significant, respectively. Thus, it can be seen that the significant and 
positive relationship between cross-border M&As by foreigners and innovation exists 
only in the local context. 
     
3. Data  
 
This paper uses panel data for 37 countries covering the period 1994 to 2005. 
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There are three criteria for selecting the sample, as follows: (1) globalization, (2) OECD 
member states, and (3) upper-middle or high income countries. The reason for using 
these three criteria is that the emphasis in this paper is on globalization, so that the most 
important economies on the five continents, namely Europe, Asia, America, Oceania 
and Africa, are included in the sample. Second, the motivation for including the OECD 
countries in the sample is that more than 90% of the world’s foreign direct investment 
originates in OECD countries (Ou Yang & Hwang, 2006), so that the vast majority of 
OECD countries are engaged in cross-border direct investment activities. Finally, the 
reason for selecting upper-middle or high income countries is that when relatively high 
income countries are compared with low income countries, the higher income countries 
will tend to engage in R&D activities, and will attach greater importance to patents, 
which are the embodiment of intellectual property rights.  
As shown in Table 1, the sample is subdivided into continents, with 22 countries in 
Europe, eight countries in Asia, four countries in the Americas, two countries in 
Oceania, and one country in Africa. Second, as shown in Table 2, there are 28 OECD 
member countries and nine countries that are not members of the OECD. Finally, when 
countries are categorized according to the World Bank’s income classification, 28 
countries are high income countries, eight are upper-middle income countries, and one 
country is a low-middle income country1. The only low-income country is China. As 
China has a significant influence on the world economy, and as one of the main 
countries into which foreign capital flows, in discussing the topic of globalization the 
Chinese economy should be incorporated into the sample. Overall, the sample 
comprises advanced countries, that is, a highly competitive group of countries in the 
world market that encompasses the world’s major economies on all five continents. 
                                                       
1 According to the World Bank’s income classification, income can be subdivided into the following four 
levels: high, upper-middle, lower-middle, and low. 
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Although we do not examine each country in the world in detail, the sample serves as a 
basis for discussing the topic of globalization in the broader sense. 
    In addition, the data for all the variables are obtained primarily from three sources: 
OECD’s Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI) for 2007, the United Nations’ 
World Investment Report (hereafter WIR) published in 2008, and the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (hereafter WDI), also published in 2008. Due to the 
omission of data on Singapore’s exports (the data were not available from 1994 to 2000), 
the data for Singapore’s exports were obtained from the Singapore Trade Development 
Board. In addition, as Taiwan is not included in the above publications, the data for 
Taiwan were obtained from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Taiwan. 
    This paper uses patents as a proxy for innovation, as shown in Table 3. In selecting 
the number of patents, previous studies have frequently used the number of patent 
applications submitted to a specific patent office as the innovation index (Branstetter, 
2006; Deolalikar & Evenson, 1989). Alternatively, they have used the “corresponding” 
numbers of patents applied for to the patent offices of two countries to represent this 
number, and thereby facilitate a comparison (Han & Lee, 2007). In this paper, it is 
argued that comparing the differences in innovation output between countries will lead 
to bias, due to the host country’s home advantage, if only the applications for patents to 
a single patent office are used. When an inventor applies for a patent, as compared with 
applying to a patent office in another country, they are more likely to prefer to apply to 
their own country’s patent office for a patent. For this reason, we use a triadic patent that 
is based on “simultaneous” applications for approval to patent offices in Europe, USA 
and Japan as our indicator. In this way, we can reduce the bias that is generated due to 
the host country’s advantage.  
In addition, as a patent is the outcome of innovation, if we can presume that a 
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higher economic value of an innovation is implied by a triadic patent, the greater will 
the patent be able to reflect economic growth. In addition, this paper uses patents 
applied for in one direction to the European patent office, that is, unilateral patents, so 
that we can further compare whether differences in the numbers of patents are 
significant in relation to the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
Exports and international direct investment constitute the main channel of 
technology spillover among countries (Branstetter, 2006; Liu & Zou, 2008). Of these, 
international direct investment is bidirectional, and can be divided into ODI and IDI 
(Pottelsberghe & Lichtenberg, 2001). Meanwhile, based on the definition provided in 
the WIR for 2008, Foreign Direct Investment comprises three parts, namely, equity 
capital,2 reinvested earnings,3 and intra-company loans.4 Thus, we further decompose 
IDI into two parts, namely cross-border M&As by foreigners, and other direct 
investment.  
In addition, R&D activities require inputs over a long period of time to produce 
results, the inputs in the current period will be separated from the benefits not yet seen 
by a time lag extending to future periods (Tsou & Liu, 1997). For this reason, the lag of 
R&D is taken into consideration (Han & Lee, 2007). The above explanatory variables 
are shown in Table 3. As the sample includes data for 37 countries, to remove 
differences in the amounts expended on R&D varying from country to country, all of the 
explanatory variables are divided by their own-country GDP. 
    From Table 4, which gives the descriptive statistics for the empirical variables, three 
phenomena may be observed. First, regardless of whether the triadic patent 
                                                       
2  This refers to shares of companies bought by foreign direct investors outside the countries in which they 
reside. 
3 This refers to the portion of the surplus on the direct investors’ investments that is retained and used for 
reinvestment. 
4 This refers to the loans in the form of short-term or long-term funds between direct investors and 
affiliated companies.  
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(TRI_PATENT) or the unilateral patent (EPO_PATENT) is used, the respective 
standard deviations are both twice as large as their means. From this, we see that the 
patent information is characterized by over-dispersion. Second, by adding the means of 
total exports (EXP) and ODI, their combined share of GDP exceeds 40 percent (0.3896 
+ 0.0254 = 0.415). In other words, exports and ODI together account for a high 
proportion of international trade. Third, with cross-border M&As by foreigners (M & 
A_SALE) accounting for more than one-half of IDI (0.0176 / 0.0325 = 0.54), it is clear 
that cross-border M&As are the main component of international direct investment.  
 
4. Models 
4.1 Negative binomial model 
 
As a patent is a non-negative discrete variable, this paper uses the count data model. 
The two types of count data model commonly used are the Poisson model and the 
Negative binomial model. The Poisson model’s probability density function is given in 
equation (1), where ity  is the number of patents in country i  in year t , and it  is the 
average number of patents in country i  in year t , namely the unit frequency of patent 
applications. In this model, the mean and variance are equal, as shown in equation (2). 
However, in empirical research patent data are often characterized by over dispersion 
(Aggarwal, 2004), that is, the variance is greater than the mean. Thus, the Poisson 
model may be inappropriate, so that the negative binomial model is commonly used to 
resolve the shortcomings of the Poisson model:  
    ,...,2,1,0         
 
ny
!y
λeyProb it
it
y
it
λ
it
itit 

        (1) 
        itititit yVaryE                  (2) 
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According to Hausman et al. (1984), the negative binomial model has an 
individual and unobserved effect, which generalizes the Poisson model. It assumes that 
the Poisson model parameter, it , conforms to a Gamma   ,it  distribution, where   
does not change across countries or over time. The basic negative binomial model is 
given in equation (3) (for a detailed derivation, see Hausman et al. (1984)): 
    itityit-λ0
it
it  dλλfλ ey
1yProb itit !  
 
      it
it
y
γ
itit
itit δ1δ1
δ
1yΓγΓ
yγΓ 



               
   (3)
 
The negative binomial model relaxes the assumption in the Poisson model that the 
mean and variance are equal, so that it allows the number of patents to be characterized 
by over dispersion, as in (4): 
   21 δyVar itit
   
  δyE itit
   
 
 
   11  δyE
yVar
it
it             (4) 
 
As this paper uses panel data, we can use the fixed effects and random effects 
models, each of which is explained below. 
 
4.2 Fixed effects negative binomial model 
 
First, we configure the model parameters, it  and i , as shown in equations (5)-(8) 
below: 
iit μXβ
iitit eeαγ              (5) 
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where ity  is the number of patents in country i  in year t , it  is the expected value of 
ity , itX  denotes the explanatory variables,   is a parameter to be estimated, and i  
is the fixed effect of an individual country i  that does not change over time.     
Under the conditions of the sum of the patents, t ity , the conditional probability 
density function of  itii yyy , ... ,1  is given in equation (9). From equation (10), it can 
be seen that the variance is greater than the mean, so that this model allows the 
explained variable to be characterized by over dispersion: 
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Finally, we can derive the likelihood function, as shown in equation (11). After 
itX
it eγ    is substituted, maximum likelihood estimation can be used to obtain 
estimates of the parameters:  
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4.3 Random effects negative binomial model 
 
The steps for inferring the random effects model are essentially the same as those for 
the fixed effects model discussed above. It is necessary to configure the parameters, it  
and i , as shown in equations (12)-(15). The difference from the fixed effects model is 
that the random effects model assumes that i  is randomly distributed, in which case 
the joint probability density function for  itii yyy , ... ,1  and i  is given in equation 
(16) below: 
iit ee Xiitit
           (12) 
ie
i
i 
               (13) 
 )( itXitit eyΕγ             (14) 
iei
               (15) 
)()Pr()Pr( iiii δg y, δy           (16) 
    In order to obtain the probability density function of iy , it is necessary to use 
integration to remove i  from the joint probability density function. For this reason, it 
is necessary to select an appropriate distribution for i , as shown in equation (17), 
where iz  conforms to a Beta ( ba  , ) distribution. The probability density function is 
given in equation (18): 
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Through substitution of the above conditions and using integration, we can obtain 
the probability density function of iy , as shown in equation (19), and obtain its 
likelihood function, as in equation (20). After itXit eγ    is substituted, by using 
maximum likelihood estimation, we can obtain the estimates of the parameters: 
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
The basic model in this paper examines the impact of exports, ODI, IDI and R&D 
expenditure, using a time lag of one period on triadic patents, with the empirical model 
given in equation (21). In (21), it  represents the expected value of the triadic patent, 
itEXP  denotes exports, itODI  is outward direct investment, itIDI  is inward direct 
investment, itGERDL _1  is domestic R&D expenditure, with a time lag of one period, 
it  is the error term, and 1 , 2 , 3  and 6  are the parameters associated with the 
explanatory variables: 
 )_1( 6321 itititititit GERDLIDIODIEXPexpγ               (21)    
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  As the proportion of cross-border M&As in international direct investment increases 
annually (see UNCTAD, 2007), we decompose inward direct investment (IDI) into 
cross-border M&As by foreigners and other direct investment, with a view to 
examining the impact of these two forces on triadic patents. The empirical model is 
given in equation (22), where itSALEMA _  denotes cross-border M&As by foreigners, 
itPRIVATE  is other direct investment, it , itEXP , itODI , itGERDL _1  and it  is as 
defined above, and 1 , 2 , 4 , 5  and 6  are the parameters: 
)_1_( 65421 ititititititit GERDLPRIVATESALEMAODIEXPexpγ  
(22) 
In order to make the empirical results reflect more accurately the source of most 
R&D expenditure, we change the data on R&D expenditure from total domestic R&D 
expenditure (GERD) to R&D expenditure for the domestic business sector (BERD). 
The empirical model is given in equation (23), where itBERDL _1  represents R&D 
expenditure in the domestic business sector, with a time lag of one period. The 
definitions of the rest of the variables are as described above, and 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  
and 5  are the parameters: 
)_1_( 75421 ititititititit BERDLPRIVATESALEMAODIEXPexpγ  
      (23) 
  Finally, the patent data are changed from triadic patents to unilateral patents, and the 
empirical model is given in equation (24), where it  represents the expected values of 
the unilateral patents, the definitions of the remaining variables are as described above, 
and 1 , 2 , 4 , 5  and 6  are the parameters: 
)_1_( 65421 ititititititit GERDLPRIVATESALEMAODIEXPexp  
(24) 
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5. Empirical Results 
 
The basic model used in the empirical analysis examines the impact of four 
variables, namely exports, ODI, IDI and R&D expenditure on patents. In order to 
maintain consistency, it is necessary to determine the number of periods for which R&D 
expenditure is deferred in order to establish the basic model. In order to enhance 
efficiency in estimation, we use bootstrapping methods to estimate the variances. Tables 
5-10 report the t-values both with and without bootstrapping. 
Table 5 reports the results of determining the number of periods by which the R&D 
expenditure should be deferred using the negative binomial model based on both fixed 
and random effects. The empirical results indicate that the influence of R&D 
expenditure deferred one period improves explanatory power. The finding that the 
impact of the R&D input on patents has a one-period lag effect is consistent with that of 
Tsou & Liu (1997). For this reason, in the subsequent discussion, R&D expenditure 
deferred one period (L1_GERD) will serve as the R&D expenditure variable, such that 
columns (2) and (6) in Table 5 will be the basic model.  
    In Table 6, we test the model using the Hausman test, with the null hypothesis as the 
random effects model, and the alternative hypothesis as the fixed effects model. As the 
test does not reject the null hypothesis, the subsequent analysis is explained using the 
random effects model. 5  From the basic model, we can draw the following four 
conclusions:  
(i) Exports (EXP) exhibit a significant positive relationship with patents at the 
1% level. This result explains the strong competition facing world markets. 
For a country’s exporters to gain a foothold in international markets, it is 
necessary to improve the quality of their exports. For this reason, they have 
                                                       
5 Although this paper discusses the random effects model, each of the tables also lists the results for the 
fixed effects model. 
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an incentive to engage in R&D, and to apply for patents to protect their 
innovations, thereby enhancing their export competitiveness.  
(ii) Outward direct investment (ODI) also exhibits a significant and positive 
relationship with patents at the 1% level, which indicates that a country that 
is engaged in ODI is able to access knowledge, technology and other 
additional products from the host country, import this to the home country, 
to engage in innovative R&D to enhance the level of technology, and in turn 
apply for a patent. In contrast, inward direct investment (IDI) by foreigners 
exhibits a negative, but insignificant, relationship with the home country’s 
patents. This indicates that inflows of foreign investment not only do not 
positively benefit the innovation in the home country, but negatively 
impacts it instead. The results of the impact of the two-way direct 
investment (ODI and IDI) effect on innovation are consistent with the 
conclusion reached by Pottelsberghe & Lichtenberg (2001).  
(iii) Domestic R&D expenditure with a lag of one period (L1_GERD) exhibits a 
positive relationship with the patent at the 10% level. The results suggest 
that further discussion on this issue is required, as R&D expenditure and 
patents are innovative inputs and outputs, and hence should be characterized 
by a highly significant relationship. For this reason, we discuss this issue at 
greater length below.  
(iv) By comparing three behavioural coefficients, namely exports, ODI and 
R&D expenditure, that can be determined in the home country, it is found 
that the impacts of all three coefficients on patents, from the largest to the 
smallest, are as follows: R&D expenditure (10.364), exports (1.476), and 
ODI (1.411). 
 Table 7 presents the empirical results for equation (22), wherein IDI is 
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decomposed into cross-border M&As, and other direct investment by foreigners, and 
the impact of each on patents is then tested. The empirical results are presented in Table 
7, and there are two conclusions:  
(i) the relationships and significance between exports, ODI, R&D expenditure 
with a lag of one period and patents are all consistent with the results of the 
basic model;  
(ii) cross-border M&As by foreigners exhibit a positive, but not significant, 
relationship with the patents.  
This result is consistent with that of Bertrand & Zuniga (2006), who use 14 OECD 
member countries as their sample. Other direct investment has a negative relationship 
with patents at the 10% level. From these two impacts on patents, one negative and one 
positive, we can indirectly explain why IDI exhibits a negative but insignificant 
relationship on patents. The reason is that the negative effect of other direct investment 
on patents is stronger than the positive effect on patents of cross-border M&As by 
foreigners. In other words, inflows of foreign capital, in general, are of little or no 
benefit to domestic innovation. However, if these inflows are decomposed into two 
parts, namely, cross-border M&As by foreigners and other direct investment, then it is 
not the case that they have no effect on domestic innovation, but rather that there is only 
a limited positive effect on innovation. 
 The results of the basic model show that R&D expenditure does not have a 
significant impact on patents, and so this section examines the innovation input and 
output sides, as represented by R&D expenditure and patent data. First, we change the 
R&D expenditure data from the overall domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) used in the 
basic model into the domestic business sector R&D expenditure (BERD), and examine 
whether this replacement is able to change the significance of R&D expenditure on 
patents. By comparing columns (2) and (4) in Table 8, it can be seen that, in the random 
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effects model, R&D expenditure with a lag of one period is still not significant for 
patents, but the estimated coefficients are significantly different from each other.6 
Second, the patent data based on triadic patents (TRI_PATENT) are replaced with data 
based on unilateral patents (EPO_PATENT). From columns (6) and (8) in Table 9, it can 
be seen from the random effects model that the significance of the three explanatory 
variables, namely R&D expenditure with a lag of one period, other direct investment 
and cross-border M&As by foreigners, markedly increases for unilateral patents when 
compared with that for triadic patents. For the first two variables, this significance 
increases from the 10% to the 1% level, while in the case of cross-border M&As by 
foreigners, this significance increases less markedly to the 5% level.  
Thus, it can be seen that the differences in the patent data differ markedly in 
relation to the significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. In other 
words, when comparing the results of innovation across countries, the selection of 
patents is important. Taking the present paper as an example, because the sample 
encompasses five continents, if unilateral patents are used as the innovation indicator, 
such a choice is clearly not objective and easily leads to bias. Thus, it is suggested that 
using the triadic patent as a proxy for innovation is more appropriate. 
 The empirical results above have shown that inflows of foreign capital are of little 
or no benefit to domestic innovation, but instead lead to a negative impact. In contrast, 
by engaging in autonomous behaviour through exports, ODI and R&D, it is possible to 
promote innovation activities domestically. In order that excessive reliance and 
expectations are not placed on inflows of foreign capital, the best policy for the 
promotion of innovation is to maintain a firm grasp on the domestic country’s affairs. It 
is only in this way that the level of technology can be enhanced, technical standards 
                                                       
6 Based on the random effects model, the L1_GERD coefficient has a value of 10.244, and the L1_BERD 
coefficient a value of 15.235.  
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upgraded, and ultimately the promotion of economic growth sustained. 
The reason why inventors apply for patents is to protect their innovations. 
However, behind the results of innovation, there is usually a perceived economic value. 
The higher is this economic value, the greater is the incentive for these inventors to 
apply simultaneously for patents in different countries. From the definitions of the 
variables described above, triadic patents represent simultaneous applications for 
patents in Europe, USA and Japan, while unilateral patents refer to applications for 
patents made to the European patent office. For this reason, it can be assumed that 
triadic patents are superior to unilateral patents in terms of representing economic 
benefits.  
Columns (5) and (7) in Table 9 present the regression results in relation to triadic 
and unilateral patents, and these suggest the following phenomena. The first 
phenomenon is that the contribution of ODI to products of low economic value in the 
home country is greater than that of products of high economic value. In this paper, we 
propose two possible reasons. First, although ODI results in the capital-receiving 
country obtaining factors such as technology and knowledge that are helpful to the 
home country’s innovation, individuals are rational, as are countries, in general. For this 
reason, the host country will retain a number of key innovation factors (products with 
relatively high economic value), so that it will not be easy to obtain technology in 
relation to ODI that has a correspondingly high economic value. Second, the samples 
used in this paper are primarily for developed countries, with upper-middle levels of 
income or higher, and the bids for ODI for the countries sampled are mostly directed 
towards countries with levels of technology lower than their own. Thus, the level of 
technology that can be obtained is limited, so that it is not easy to obtain technology 
with a high economic value.  
The second phenomenon is that the impact of IDI on the absolute value of the 
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coefficient of the triadic patent coefficient is greater than the absolute value of the 
coefficient of the unilateral patent.7 That is, the harm done to the home country’s 
products of high economic value is greater than that to its products of low economic 
value. This paper proposes two possible reasons for this phenomenon. In relation to 
foreign investment, the inflows of such investment into the domestic country will not 
only generate substantial economic profits, but will also result in some factors being 
obtained that can help domestic innovation. The more important are these innovation 
factors, the better, that is, the greater is the economic value of the products, the better. 
For this reason, the harm done to the domestic country’s products of high economic 
value will be greater. 
Finally, in order to verify the two observed phenomena discussed above, we 
change the R&D expenditure variable from total domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) to 
domestic business sector R&D expenditure (BERD). We test the differences between 
these R&D expenditure variables in order to examine whether we can obtain the same 
phenomena. The empirical results presented in columns (5) and (7) in Table 10 suggest 
that the above two phenomena still exist, so that, regardless of whether GERD or BERD 
is used for R&D expenditure:  
(1) the contribution of ODI to the domestic country’s products of low economic 
value is greater than that to products of high economic value; and  
(2) the harm caused by IDI to the domestic country’s products of high economic 
value is greater than that done to products of low economic value.     
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
                                                       
7 As IDI has a negative relationship with the patents, our goal is to compare which of the two impacts of 
IDI on triadic and unilateral patents has the greater influence. The existence of a negative value will 
influence the results, and so it is necessary to use absolute values.  
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In this paper, we used panel data for 37 countries covering the period 1994 to 2005, 
and performed an empirical analysis using a negative binomial model. The main 
purpose was to examine the impact of the two main technology spillover channels, 
namely international direct investment (IDI) and exports on innovation. IDI was 
decomposed into outward direct investment (ODI) and inward direct investment (IDI) 
based on the direction of capital flows, and because of the increasing importance over 
the years of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (cross-border M&As) by foreigners. 
For these reasons, we decomposed inward direct investment into cross-border M&As 
by foreigners and other direct investment. In addition, as R&D expenditure and patents 
are innovation inputs and outputs, we also included R&D expenditure in the model as an 
explanatory variable. Moreover, among the explained variables, we used the number of 
patents as a proxy variable for innovation, and also used data on both triadic and 
unilateral patents. 
In summary, within the context of globalization, this paper investigated the impact 
of the exports, ODI, IDI, cross-border M&As by foreigners and R&D expenditure on 
the number of patents for 37 countries that are considered to be highly competitive in 
world markets. Based on the empirical results, we can draw the following conclusions: 
1. Among the main channels of international trade, exports and ODI exhibited a 
positive relationship with the domestic country’s patents, that is, increased exports 
and ODI are able to stimulate an increase in patent output. In contrast, IDI exhibits 
a negative relationship with domestic patents.  
2. R&D expenditure deferred one period has a significant and positive impact on the 
number of patents, which explains the deferred nature of the impact of the R&D 
input on the patents. The input in the current period will only exhibit a significant 
outcome in the following period. 
3. The respective impacts of cross-border M&As by foreigners and other direct 
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investment on patents are found to be positive and negative, respectively. This 
finding explains the impact of IDI on domestic innovation as being characterized 
by two forces, and the negative effect of other direct investment is greater than the 
positive effect of cross-border M&As by foreigners. 
4. Differences in patent data can lead to substantial differences in the estimated 
results.  
Finally, when comparing the results of innovation among countries within the 
framework of globalization, if unilateral patents are used as the explained variable, the 
results obtained are likely to be much improved. However, it is also likely that, because 
of the presence of a host country advantage, the empirical estimates are likely to be 
biased. Thus, it is necessary to use triadic patents as a proxy for innovation as they are a 
more appropriate variable, and also closer to the actual innovation results for each 
country. 
In an era of globalization, although countries are frequently engaged in exchange 
with each other, each government has sought to attract foreign investment, and has been 
wary of outflows of capital from the domestic economy. However, the empirical results 
indicate that the competitive behaviour between countries is similarly rational and 
individualistic, so that inflows of foreign capital are of little or no benefit to domestic 
innovation, and instead can lead to a negative impact. In contrast, countries that engage 
in autonomous behaviour related to exports, ODI and R&D input are then able to 
encourage innovation activities. In other words, there are not excessive expectations of, 
or reliance on, inflows of foreign funds from abroad, so that inflows of foreign capital 
may contribute to a country’s GDP in the short term. However, when viewed from a 
long-term perspective, the key to sustained and stable economic growth is still 
innovation, and the promotion of such innovation must still be grasped. Only in this way 
can the level of technology be raised and the sustained growth of the economy 
26 
 
ultimately enhanced. 
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Table 1. OECD Countries  
 Europe Asia America Oceania Africa
 
Country 
United Kingdom, Austria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Norway, Slovenia, 
Poland, Romania 
Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, 
Israel, Turkey, 
Chinese 
Taipei, 
Russian 
Federation, 
China 
USA, 
Canada, 
Mexico, 
Argentina 
Australia, 
New 
Zealand,  
South 
Africa 
Total  22 8 4 2 1 
 
 
Table 2. OECD Countries by Income 
Income Level OECD Member Non-OECD Member Total  
High   25a 3b 28 
Upper-Middle   3c 5d 8 
Lower-Middle  0 1e 1 
Total  28 9 37 
Source: World Bank  
Notes: a: United Kingdom, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Norway, Japan, Korea, United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia; b: 
Slovenia, Singapore, Israel; c:  Poland, Turkey, Mexico; d:  Romania, Taiwan, Russian 
Federation, Argentina, South Africa; e: China 
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Table 3. Variables 
Dependent Variable 
TRI_PATENT Triadic Patenta Number of triadic patent families. 
(that is, a patent is filed at the EPO, 
the JPO and is granted by the 
USPTO. 
EPO_PATENT European Patent Office 
Patentb 
Number of patent applications to the 
EPOc. 
Independent Variable 
EXP Export Ratio of Export divided by GDP
 
ODI Outward Direct Investment Ratio of ODI divided by GDP
 
IDI Inward Direct Investment Ratio of IDI divided by GDP
 
M&A_SALE Inward Cross-Border M&As Ratio of Inward Cross-Border M&As 
divided by GDP
 PRIVATE Other Direct Investment Variable “IDI” minus Variable 
“M&A_SALE”
 GERD Gross Domestic Expenditure 
on R&D 
Ratio of Gross Domestic Expenditure 
on R&D by GDP
 BERD Expenditure on R&D in the 
Business Enterprise Sector 
Ratio of Expenditure on R&D in the 
Business Enterprise Sector by GDP
 L0, L1, L2, L3 Three-year time lag: Current, 
one year, two year and three 
year time lag in sequence 
 
Notes:  
a: The primary dependent variable, provided with the intention of improving international 
comparability (the home advantage is suppressed, the values of the patents are more 
homogeneous) (OECD, 2007).  
b: The minor dependent variable that is compared with the triadic patent. 
c: The European Patent Office provides a uniform application procedure for individual 
inventors and companies seeking patent protection in up to 40 European countries, and is the 
executive arm of the European Patent Organization. The European Patent Organization is an 
intergovernmental organization that was established in 1977 on the basis of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), signed in Munich in 1973. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Error Min. Max. 
TRI_PATENT 1184.124 3182.044 0 16368 
EPO_PATENT 2644.446 6031.128 3 32064 
EXP .3896 .2490 .0752 1.9006 
ODI .0254 .0415 -.0497 .4351 
IDI .0325 .0410 -.1578 .2675 
M&A_SALE .0176 .0236 0 .2321 
PRIVATE .0149 .0348 -.1698 .2130 
L1_GERD .0202 .0101 .0046 .0662 
L1_BERD .0122 .0081 .0012 .0498 
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Table 5. Time Lags of R&D 
Fixed Effects Random Effects TRI_ 
PATENT (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXP 1.604 
(2.77)*** 
[9.07]*** 
1.526 
(3.02)***
[8.57]***
1.423 
(1.98)**
[7.85]***
1.245 
(1.76)* 
[6.44]***
1.553 
(2.99)***
[8.73]***
1.476 
(3.02)***
[8.24]***
1.375 
(1.92)* 
[7.55]*** 
1.197 
(1.81)* 
[6.16]***
ODI 
 
1.404 
(2.93)*** 
[2.95]*** 
1.377 
(2.99)*** 
[3.01]*** 
1.175 
(2.57)*** 
[2.61]*** 
1.018 
(2.22)** 
[2.30]** 
1.427 
(2.91)***
[2.99]***
1.411 
(3.03)***
[3.08]***
1.207 
(2.55)** 
[2.68]*** 
1.049 
(2.29)**
[2.37]**
IDI -0.912 
(-1.21) 
[-1.92]* 
-0.859 
(-1.60) 
[-1.89]* 
-0.724 
(-1.42) 
[-1.65]* 
-0.646 
(-1.43) 
[-1.49] 
-0.938 
(-1.26) 
[-1.96]**
-0.883 
(-1.62) 
[-1.93]* 
-0.735 
(-1.44) 
[-1.66]* 
-0.650 
(-1.44) 
[-1.49] 
L0_GERD 11.837 
(1.33) 
[3.83]*** 
 
 
 
 
 12.648 
(1.47) 
[4.13]*** 
 
 
  
L1_GERD 
 
 9.577 
(1.56) 
[3.15]*** 
   10.364 
(1.68)* 
[3.45]*** 
  
L2_GERD   6.647 
(1.08) 
[2.21]** 
   7.383 
(1.17) 
[2.48]** 
 
L3_GERD 
 
   5.346 
(0.97) 
[1.78]* 
   6.024 
(0.96) 
[2.03]** 
CONSTANTS 
 
1.608 
(2.73)*** 
[14.27]***
1.848 
(2.61)***
[15.85]***
2.092 
(2.35)**
[17.31]***
2.347 
(1.90)* 
[18.13]***
1.605 
(2.72)***
[14.23]***
1.845 
(2.62)***
[15.80]***
2.089 
(2.29)** 
[17.26]***
2.346 
(1.98)**
[18.08]***
Log 
likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1967.3 
35.10 
-1770.0 
24.66 
-1578.2 
9.95 
-1387.3 
9.19 
-2316.9 
34.87 
-2117.5 
23.14 
-1923.5 
10.05 
-1729.6 
8.91 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.063 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
440 
37 
403 
37 
366 
37 
329 
37 
440 
37 
403 
37 
366 
37 
329 
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are in parentheses, and t-statistics without bootstrapping are 
in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Basic Model 
TRI_PATENT Fixed Effects Random Effects 
EXP 
1.526 
(3.02)*** 
[8.57]*** 
1.476 
(3.02)*** 
[8.24]*** 
ODI 
1.377 
(2.99)*** 
[3.01]*** 
1.411 
(3.03)*** 
[3.08]*** 
IDI 
-0.859 
(-1.60) 
[-1.89]* 
-0.883 
(-1.62) 
[-1.93]* 
L1_GERD 
9.577 
(1.56) 
[3.15]*** 
10.364 
(1.68)* 
[3.45]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.848 
(2.61)*** 
[15.85]*** 
1.845 
(2.62) 
[15.80]*** 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1769.9537 
24.66 
-2117.5386 
23.14 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
Hausman test  -0.36 
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are in parentheses, and t-statistics without bootstrapping are 
in brackets. *** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Model with Decomposition of IDI 
TRI_PATENT Fixed Effects Random Effects 
EXP 
1.489 
(3.08)*** 
[8.28]*** 
1.438 
(2.92)*** 
[7.94]*** 
ODI 
 
1.255 
(2.91)*** 
[2.73]*** 
1.286 
(3.05)*** 
[2.80]*** 
M&A_SALE 
0.267 
(0.51) 
[0.37] 
0.290 
(0.52) 
[0.40] 
PRIVATE 
-1.297 
(-1.81)* 
[-2.56]*** 
-1.346 
(-1.76)* 
[-2.64]*** 
L1_GERD 
9.457 
(1.54) 
[3.10]*** 
10.244 
(1.66)* 
[3.40]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.858 
(2.65)*** 
[15.87]*** 
1.855 
(2.71)*** 
[15.81]*** 
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2 
-1768.2 
26.86 
-2115.6 
26.10 
Probchi2 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are in parentheses, and t-statistics without bootstrapping are 
in brackets. *** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Effects of Using Different R&D Data 
TRI_PATENT 
Fixed Effects 
(1) 
Random Effects 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
(3) 
Random Effects 
(4) 
EXP 
1.489 
(3.08)*** 
[8.28]*** 
1.438 
(2.92)*** 
[7.94]*** 
1.431 
(3.03)*** 
[7.83]*** 
1.379 
(3.08)*** 
[7.48]*** 
ODI 
1.255 
(2.91)*** 
[2.73]*** 
1.286 
(3.05)*** 
[2.80]*** 
1.217 
(3.09)*** 
[2.68]*** 
1.244 
(2.91)*** 
[2.74]*** 
M&A_SALE 
.267 
(0.51) 
[0.37] 
.290 
(0.52) 
[0.40] 
.209 
(0.39) 
[0.30] 
.233 
(0.44) 
[0.33] 
PRIVATE 
-1.297 
(-1.81)* 
[-2.56]*** 
-1.346 
(-1.76)* 
[-2.64]*** 
-1.249 
(-1.83)* 
[-2.50]** 
-1.294 
(-1.80)* 
[-2.56]*** 
L1_GERD 
9.457 
(1.54) 
[3.10]*** 
10.244 
(1.66)* 
[3.40]*** 
 
 
 
 
L1_BERD 
 
 
 
 
14.295 
(1.39) 
[4.00]*** 
15.235 
(1.61) 
[4.32]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.858 
(2.65)*** 
[15.87]*** 
1.855 
(2.71)*** 
[15.81]*** 
1.951 
(2.91)*** 
[17.12]*** 
1.953 
(2.96)*** 
[17.10]*** 
Log likelihood -1768.2 -2115.6 -1737.0 -2083.9 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
26.86 
0.000 
26.10 
0.000 
29.60 
0.000 
26.17 
0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
403 
37 
403 
37 
399 
37 
399 
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are in parentheses, and t-statistics without bootstrapping are 
in brackets. *** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 9. Effects of Using Different Patent Data (under GERD) 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXP 
1.526 
(3.02)*** 
[8.57]*** 
1.489 
(3.08)*** 
[8.28]*** 
1.612 
(1.89)* 
[11.52]***
1.578 
(1.97)** 
[11.26]*** 
1.476 
(3.02)*** 
[8.24]*** 
1.438 
(2.92)*** 
[7.94]*** 
1.563 
(1.95)* 
[11.01]*** 
1.529 
(2.00)** 
[10.73]*** 
ODI 
1.377 
(2.99)*** 
[3.01]*** 
1.255 
(2.91)*** 
[2.73]*** 
1.922 
(3.34)*** 
[4.29]*** 
1.848 
(3.84)*** 
[4.17]*** 
1.411 
(3.03)*** 
[3.08]*** 
1.286 
(3.05)*** 
[2.80]*** 
1.943 
(3.40)*** 
[4.34]*** 
1.876 
(3.81)*** 
[4.23]*** 
IDI 
-0.859 
(-1.60) 
[-1.89]* 
 
-.750 
(-1.36) 
[-1.54] 
 
-0.883 
(-1.62) 
[-1.93]* 
 
-0.785 
(-1.47) 
[-1.60] 
 
M&A_SALE  
0.267 
(0.51) 
[0.37] 
 
1.271 
(1.98)** 
[1.81]* 
 
0.290 
(0.52) 
[0.40] 
 
1.291 
(2.03)** 
[1.84]* 
PRIVATE  
-1.297 
(-1.81) 
[-2.56]*** 
 
-1.574 
(-2.83)*** 
[-2.97]*** 
 
-1.346 
(-1.76)* 
[-2.64]***
 
-1.650 
(-2.86)*** 
[-3.08]*** 
L1_GERD 
9.577 
(1.56) 
[3.15]*** 
9.457 
(1.54) 
[3.10]*** 
20.417 
(3.15)*** 
[6.97]*** 
20.098 
(3.07)*** 
[6.81]*** 
10.364 
(1.68)* 
[3.45]*** 
10.244 
(1.66)* 
[3.40]*** 
21.050 
(3.23)*** 
[7.27]*** 
20.737 
(3.19)*** 
[7.10]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.848 
(2.61)*** 
[15.85]*** 
1.858 
(2.65)*** 
[15.87]*** 
1.125 
(2.51)** 
[10.80]***
1.148 
(2.64)*** 
[10.96]*** 
1.845 
(2.62)*** 
[15.80]***
1.855 
(2.71)*** 
[15.81]***
1.130 
(2.56)** 
[10.86]*** 
1.153 
(2.59)*** 
[11.01]*** 
Loglikelihood -1770.0 -1768.2 -2280.6 -2274.9 -2117.5 -2115.6 -2671.5 -2665.4 
Wald chi2 24.66 26.86 43.67 81.37 23.14 26.10 41.51 76.40 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are in parentheses, and t-statistics without bootstrapping are 
in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 10. Effects of Using Different Patent Data (under BERD) 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT TRI_PATENT EPO_PATENT 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXP 
1.465 
(3.13)*** 
[8.10]*** 
1.431 
(3.03)*** 
[7.83]*** 
1.595 
(2.05)** 
[11.25]***
1.563 
(2.13)** 
[11.01]***
1.414 
(3.05)*** 
[7.75]*** 
1.379 
(3.08)*** 
[7.48]*** 
1.540 
(2.08)** 
[10.71]*** 
1.514 
(2.20)** 
[10.46]*** 
ODI 
1.327 
(3.00)*** 
[2.93]*** 
1.217 
(3.09)*** 
[2.68]*** 
1.816 
(3.38)*** 
[4.11]***
1.744 
(3.80)*** 
[3.99]***
1.356 
(3.01)*** 
[2.99]*** 
1.244 
(2.91)*** 
[2.74]*** 
1.834 
(3.39)*** 
[4.16]*** 
1.768 
(4.01)*** 
[4.04]*** 
IDI 
-0.830 
(-1.62) 
[-1.86]* 
 
-0.700 
(-1.26) 
[-1.49] 
 
-0.850 
(-1.61) 
[-1.89]* 
 
-0.729 
(-1.40) 
[-1.54] 
 
M&A_SALE  
0.209 
(0.39) 
[0.30] 
 
1.190 
(1.89)* 
[1.74]* 
 
0.233 
(0.44) 
[0.33] 
 
1.211 
(2.05)** 
[1.78]* 
PRIVATE  
-1.249 
(-1.83)* 
[-2.50]** 
 
-1.481 
(-2.71)***
[-2.89]***
 
-1.294 
(-1.80)* 
[-2.56]*** 
 
-1.549 
(-2.85)*** 
[-2.99]*** 
L1_BERD 
14.455 
(1.53) 
[4.07]*** 
14.295 
(1.39) 
[4.00]*** 
26.921 
(2.88)*** 
[7.86]***
26.447 
(2.90)*** 
[7.65]***
15.395 
(1.63) 
[4.38]*** 
15.235 
(1.61) 
[4.32]*** 
27.620 
(2.86)*** 
[8.15]*** 
27.149 
(3.01)*** 
[7.95]*** 
CONSTANTS 
1.942 
(2.89)*** 
[17.11]*** 
1.951 
(2.91)*** 
[17.12]*** 
1.273 
(2.89)*** 
[12.76]***
1.295 
(3.01)*** 
[12.92]***
1.944 
(2.92)*** 
[17.10]*** 
1.953 
(2.96)*** 
[17.10]*** 
1.282 
(3.10)*** 
[12.88]*** 
1.304 
(3.06)*** 
[13.03]*** 
Log 
likelihood 
-1738.6 -1737.0 -2244.7 -2239.4 -2085.6 -2083.9 -2635.3 -2629.6 
Wald chi2 24.43 29.60 39.80 76.72 22.75 26.17 36.04 74.13 
Prob chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Groups 
Observations 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
37 
399 
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are in parentheses, and t-statistics without bootstrapping are 
in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1. Global Outward Direct Investment 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
Figure 2. Global Exports 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 3. Global ODI & Exports to GDP Ratio 
 
Source: World Bank and UNCTAD 
